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Making Room for Dying:
End of Life Care in Nursing Homes
by SANDRA H. JOHNSON

P

eople are dying in nursing homes. This may
sound like a clarion call for a new wave of nursing home policing; instead it is a statement of a
simple fact that we must embrace. Over 20 percent of
older Americans meet their deaths in a nursing home,
and 30 percent of all persons dying in hospitals have
been transferred there from nursing homes just a few
days earlier.
Understanding that people die in nursing homes—
and should die in nursing homes, just as they should be
able to die at home—ought to drive us to improve their
care. The literature is already rich with case studies and
demonstration projects undertaken by nursing homes to
improve care of the dying. Broader change requires a
shift in culture and a reframing of the issues. Contemporary standards for nursing home quality and the accepted
framework for end of life decision-making have inadvertently placed obstacles in the path of good care for the
significant proportion of older people who will spend
their final days in a nursing home.
Enriching the Ideal for Nursing Home Care

T

he cornerstone of contemporary nursing home quality standards has been the unequivocal repudiation
of the related beliefs that nursing homes are way stations
for the dying elderly and that decline is inevitable for
nursing home residents. Instead of being resigned to inevitable decline, regulators and professionals are commit-

Sandra H. Johnson, “Making Room for Dying: End of Life Care in Nursing Homes,” Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult?
Hastings Center Report Special Report 35, no. 6 (2005): S37-S41.

ted to maintaining, if not improving, the physical, mental, and social health of nursing home residents. This
hard-won expectation of active support for maintenance
and growth rather than mere caretaking has directed
nursing homes toward a more engaged and less fatalistic
care model. This change is good, in part because the
nursing home industry, regulators, and caregivers have
become alert to substandard care that had once hidden
behind routine acceptance of physical and mental decline.
These rehabilitative, health-promoting expectations,
however, may have unintentionally produced a deathdenying culture within the nursing home. Regulations
impose standards that assume that physical, mental, and
emotional decline are signals of deficiencies in care unless
demonstrated to be otherwise. Physical changes commonly associated with dying, such as weight loss, have
thus become signs of failure, rather than a normal part of
dying, and so trigger requirements that the facility justify
its care. Because nursing home administrators are highly
sensitive to regulatory risk and avoid situations that may
attract the attention of regulators, the regulatory emphasis on positive indicators of health can discourage them
from providing good care to a dying resident. This dynamic is revealed, for example, by the fact that imminently dying residents are often transferred to hospitals so
their deaths will not occur in the nursing home and require that care be defended. Failure to accept the indicators of decline that naturally occur in dying may also be
reflected in the emphasis on tube feeding for nursing
home residents. Thus, the rehabilitative expectations,
captured and reinforced in regulation, skew nursing
home care models away from care of the dying.
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Before nursing homes can improve end of life care,
dying will have to find its place in the nursing home culture. For nursing homes, a shift in culture necessarily involves paying attention to regulation and to the providers’
reactions to regulation as well as to other behaviors that
create and maintain a culture. Culture and regulation go
hand in hand in the nursing home environment because
of the pervasive scope of nursing home regulation, the enforcement orientation of regulators, and the intense risk
aversion of nursing home administrators. Efforts to make
room for the dying patient require a review of standards
and adoption of changes to facilitate the appropriate level
and type of care for them. Some have argued, for example,
that changes in the mandatory Resident Assessment Index
could more readily encourage nursing homes to provide
better palliative care. Such efforts should not require nursing homes to abandon their mission of health promotion,
however. Palliative care models view support of the dying
as active, positive, and promoting of health and human
values, even as agressive medical interventions aimed at
cure are relinquished. In addition, both hospices and
nursing homes engage in the most intimate forms of care,
and this shared experience can form a meeting ground between what are now often viewed as separate approaches
to care.
The challenge is to encourage the regulatory system to
accept the process of dying, with its accompanying physical and mental deterioration; to exercise restraint in the
use of interventions, including inquiries, that would otherwise be pursued; and to do so without creating a shield
for neglect. Nursing homes are plagued by a reputation
for neglect and abuse, but gearing the entire system to account for the bad apples can inadvertently have the effect
that all homes provide less than optimal care for the
dying. Unintentional adverse effects are a problem for any
health care regulatory system, of course. They can occur
whenever health care professionals make decisions in patient care that are motivated not by the best interests of
the patient, but by the provider’s fear of litigation or
scrutiny by a regulator. Nursing home administrators
often try intensely hard to avoid doing things that would
trigger regulatory scrutiny because part of their professional obligation is to manage legal risks. This has a very
deep effect on patient care because the administrator has a
profound influence on patient care in the nursing home
(as compared to other health care settings). Such decisions
therefore raise ethical issues concerning the duties of
health care providers, including administrators, to patients, not only to the facility. While administrators have
a professional obligation to protect the facility, ethical duties to residents’ well-being supersede their management
responsibility. Because of their influence on care, administrators cannot defer that ethical obligation to professional
caregivers.
!"$

Of course, the nursing home culture consists of more
than the regulatory environment. If the nursing home
culture is to make room for dying, the incremental patterns that maintain that culture will have to be addressed.
Publicly marking the death of a resident by more than redistributing clothing or reassigning the “bed,” expressions
of sympathy to other residents and to family, and bereavement support for staff can be significant in creating a culture that responds to the reality of death. Paying attention
to culture also broadens the focus to include the community of caregivers in the nursing home. Often, direct caregivers and residents in a nursing home differ in terms of
race and ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and culture. If
culture is taken seriously, the clashes in expectations and
values that occur between residents and caregivers—and
often between the professional and nonprofessional
staff—can be addressed as larger questions rather than as
individual conflicts with uncooperative caregivers.
Adjusting the Framework for End of Life Care

I

mproving the quality of care for the dying in nursing
homes is not solely a matter of nursing home culture
and regulation, however. It also requires adjusting the
general framework for end of life decision-making to better account for the nursing home context.
One important characteristic of the dominant legal
and ethical framework for end of life care is the drive to
the crucible—a concentration on the cases that place fundamental values in stark contrast and thus highlight intractable moral conflict. The paradigm case in the end of
life debate—whether nutrition and hydration should be
provided for a person in a persistent vegetative state—has
persisted as the test case for the moral and legal questions
for decades. But testing principles and decisions against
this paradigm can thwart progress in improving care for
the dying. By focusing squarely on issues that are more
commonplace, both in terms of incidence and in the
sense of shared values, nursing homes can improve the
lives of those who will die in their facilities. Rosalie Kane
argued that long-term care should emphasize what she
termed “everyday ethics”; similarly, the well-being of individuals living and dying in the care of nursing homes is
better served if we focus on the routine rather than the extreme.
If nursing homes have a distinctive case in which key
ethical issues are embedded, it is the decision whether to
transfer the dying resident to a hospital. Unnecessary hospitalization of nursing home residents when death appears
imminent is both a symptom of, and scaffolding for, the
culture that denies death and thus impedes the most appropriate end of life care.
Studies indicate that hospitalization when death is imminent does not provide the resident with better treatF017-G7/HA7B7-G7/,IJJK+=&!*%FL! $#F*#( (#")(*
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The challenge is to encourage the regulatory system to accept the
process of dying, with its accompanying physical and mental
deterioration; to exercise restraint in the use of interventions,
including inquiries, that would otherwise be pursued; and to do so
without creating a shield for neglect.
ment. Rather, such transfers can impair good care because
the hand-off to a new care team can result in absent or unclear transfer orders for pain and symptom management,
disruption of care plans developed with the resident or the
family, and the disturbance of moving to an unfamiliar location. Reducing the incidence of unnecessary hospitalizations can improve care of the dying significantly in the
nursing home without facing a stalemate over the moral
values of human life and human caring.
A second “common” issue is improvement in pain and
symptom management. Unrelenting pain can interfere so
completely with thought, self-awareness, emotional engagement, and social relationships that it can rob the individual of the experience of being human. But pain is
badly undertreated in nursing homes; studies report that
30 to 80 percent of residents receive inadequate pain
management. Pain management may be undercut by regulations intended to avoid excessive use of pharmaceuticals, especially those that affect awareness. Efforts to improve pain management confront a tendency on the part
of health care providers and family members to underestimate pain in the elderly, as well as the tendency of the elderly to underreport pain for fear of being a burden. Assessing pain in people with cognitive impairment requires
intense effort. Improving pain management will not grab
the headlines or fuel the debates that withdrawal of nutrition and hydration does, but it is the foundation for compassionate care for the dying.
Food and water—including medically provided nutrition and hydration—carry symbolic weight, but especially in the nursing home setting. Nutrition and hydration,
and the nutritional status of the resident, are a core measure of adequate or deficient care. Deficiencies in diet and
hydration are commonly viewed as the root cause of substantial physical and mental impairments and of injuries
ranging from bedsores to mental confusion. Poor food
service and inattention to encouraging fluid intake are, in
fact, key indicators of poor nursing home care.
Nutrition and hydration in the nursing home are also
icons of the ethic of care. The better nursing homes, for
example, understand the social and emotional power of
eating. Despite the focus on health promotion, sometimes
the primary goals of nursing home care, especially for the

families, are to keep this person safe, to keep her warm,
and to keep her fed.
Tube feeding is not the same as eating, however. Its sole
justification is that it maintains the physical health of the
patient. When tube feeding does maintain physical
health, there can be a battle over whether continuing or
stopping is moral or immoral. Increasingly, however, evidence indicates that a common intervention for tube feeding in nursing homes—percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG)—does not reduce the risk of pneumonia or
infection and may not reduce the risk of bedsores. This
new knowledge presents a challenge, or opportunity, analogous to earlier efforts to reduce the use of physical restraints in nursing homes. The two developments are similar in that the common practice was supported by a
“common knowledge”—restraints keep residents safe and
PEGs keep them healthy—that has proven mistaken. As
with restraints, new knowledge about the negative effects
of medically provided nutrition and hydration should reduce recourse to tube feeding, even when the nutritional
intake of patients appears inadequate, while strengthening
rather than rejecting the values that support feeding.
The battleground of medically provided nutrition and
hydration for the PVS patient is fought ferociously because there is disagreement over the meaning of life and
the meaning of care. In contrast, the most significant nutrition and hydration issue in the nursing home for end of
life care may now present a question of fact rather than
contested value. Unless this common practice is uncoupled from its association with the crucible of the provision
of nutrition and hydration to the patient in PVS, the
shared values that support its reduction in use will not be
recognized.
Questioning the Assumptions

D

ifferent states have varying normative and legal
frameworks for decisions concerning medical care at
the end of life. Furthermore, actual practice often differs
significantly from the principles established in the law and
in the ethics literature. In practice, for example, health
care professionals, families, and patients may bring more
nuance to the situation than either the law or the ethics
literature can encompass.
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Listening, by Robert Pope
By permission of the Robert Pope Foundation.

Three fundamental assumptions in the
current structure for end of life decisionmaking are particularly ill-suited to the
nursing home environment. These are the
concepts that “end of life care” is synonymous with “care for the dying,” that the patient is the only person whose autonomy or
well-being has moral significance, and that
there should be a presumption in favor of
life-sustaining treatment.
Legal, ethical, and clinical decision-making at the end of life still bear the mark of
their original emphasis on the significance
of terminal illness. The moral and legal distinction between terminally ill individuals
and others certainly has been modified
somewhat; however, the status of “dying”
still has significant connotations. More important, it assumes a recognizable process
with a beginning that is as clearly defined as its end.
For nursing home residents, the dying process is often
subtle and incremental. Is this pneumonia or this infection
the one that signals imminent dying, or will treatment restore the patient to her previous health status? The problem of recognizing the onset of dying may be an even
more serious problem among patients with dementia,
who constitute a significant population in nursing homes.
According to one study, only 1.1 percent of residents with
advanced dementia were identified by clinicians as having
a life expectancy of less than six months, while 71 percent
of those same patients actually died within that timeframe.
The problem of identifying the beginning of the dying
process or categorizing a patient as “dying” is not only one
of medical uncertainty. It is, rather, evidence of a lack of
language and even a lack of concepts for this stage of
human life, even though it is a stage typical of so many
nursing home residents. The problem of defining when
someone can be labeled as “dying” is also a manifestation
of the denial of death and the fear that accepting a broader “end time” will cause individuals to be neglected and
devalued. Unfortunately, when aggressive interventions
are pursued or when palliative care is withheld until one is
labeled as “dying,” individuals and their families do not
receive optimal care and support.
The dominant structure for decisions at the end of life,
however we define that period, single-mindedly focuses
on the well-being and autonomy of the patient, but this
too is a mistake; family members are not merely adjuncts
to the patient. Family members bear significant burdens
!&'

in the long-term care of an individual, even when that individual is housed in an institution. These family members can experience significant physical, emotional, and financial stress at levels that adversely affect their own
health, especially when they are older or are physically
vulnerable themselves. Their concerns and well-being
should be recognized as morally significant. Requiring
that families be singular and unflinching in their devotion
to the patient’s best interest not only demands the humanly impossible but provides an insufficient moral accounting of the situation.
The moral status of paid caregivers in a nursing home,
professional and nonprofessional alike, should not be denied. Their voice also belongs at the table for what they
can contribute to understanding appropriate care for a
particular resident. Researchers have found that nursing
home staff use family terms to describe their relationship
with residents and view themselves as protective and caring and intimate with the residents—sometimes more so
than actual family. Compensated paraprofessional caregivers engage in the most intimate care of the resident
over weeks, months, or years. Even though they are often
paid less than people working at other, less demanding
positions, their commitment to caring is evident on a
daily basis.
The autonomy and well-being of family members who
bear the burden in the care of a dying person are morally
significant, despite cases in which family members are callous, distant, and opportunistic. Similarly, compensated
caregivers should be recognized as moral agents and their
voices should be considered in decision-making about inF017-G7/HA7B7-G7/,IJJK+=&!*%FL! $#F*#( (#")(*
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Allowing individuals to choose life-sustaining treatments over those
that relieve pain or promote function, but putting the burden on them
to do so, would show respect for pluralism, freedom, and individuality
without imposing excessive burdens on individuals or their families.
dividual patients even though there may be conflicts in
values and culture, and even though there are cases where
compensated caregivers are neglectful or abusive. Such is
life; although the “exceptions define the rule,” general
practice should not be determined by the worst cases.
Bringing the conflicts and differences to the table may enrich our understanding of the best way to care.
Finally, the legal structure currently defers to individual
choice regarding life-sustaining treatment. Legal standards
defer to individual choice out of respect for the pluralism
and freedom that lead us to disagree on the “one right
thing” to do and out of fear that any diminution in the
commitment to prolong life would result in a devaluation
of human life, or that any community effort to identify
appropriate care would destroy personal liberty. Deference
to individual choice places confidence in the inherent
value of individuation even though identifying the choices of incompetent individuals presents serious and familiar
difficulties. It is also a deference that weights the scale significantly in favor of medical intervention. Thus the medical intervention holds a favored position, not the individual’s life history and values or the more complex goals of
care.
With advances in palliative care as a discipline and with
increasing expertise in relieving suffering, it is time to consider whether the presumption in favor of life-sustaining
treatment should be changed to a presumption in favor of
care that provides comfort, relieves suffering, or promotes
activities of daily living. Stating the presumption in that
fashion would bring the goals of palliative care to the forefront and put life-sustaining medical interventions in
proper perspective. People do vary in their preferences and
convictions. Allowing individuals to choose treatments
that do not relieve pain or promote function but putting
the burden on them to do so would support respect for

pluralism, freedom, and individuality without imposing
excessive burdens on individuals or their families when the
choice is merely unclear.
This essay necessarily speaks about nursing homes and
nursing home residents in general terms. Not all nursing
home residents are alike, however; and not all nursing
homes are the same. Some nursing home residents are
alert and engaged; others are in various stages of dementia;
some are insensate. Obviously, the goals of care for dying
nursing home residents and the expectations for nursing
homes will have to account for these variations. The term
“nursing home” itself is a catch-all phrase sometimes used
indiscriminately for many different levels of long-term
care. Even among skilled nursing facilities there is significant disparity in how ill and disabled residents are, and
this, too, will influence appropriate care models.
The quality of nursing homes also varies considerably.
This essay leaves the problem of policing the bad apples
largely on the shelf. Although it is a significant problem,
the design and implementation of a regulatory system has
to follow the identification of appropriate goals and standards for quality of care rather than the goals and standards developed for purposes of enforcement. At the very
least, these two perspectives need to be in dialogue and
perhaps in tension; one arm of the effort should not exclude the other.
Advocates for nursing home residents and those nursing homes in the leadership of best practices have worked
hard to dismantle the stereotype of the nursing home as a
warehouse for those who are declining into death. This
work needs to be protected. However, once dying is recognized as an undeniable part of living—including living
in a nursing home—it is clear that the ideal of health promotion will have to embrace care for the dying.

!"#$%&' (#")(*+,%-./01234,#35,06,'267,$8/79,:;<,=8>,%?,@773,!0,A2662BCD?E

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1682115

!&(

